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SHADOW WORKS AND SHADOW MARKETS:
HOW PRIVATIZATION OF WELFARE
SERVICES PRODUCES AN
1
ALTERNATIVE MARKET
BRIDGETTE BALDWIN*
INTRODUCTION
The rhetoric of Ivan Illich has been discussed, analyzed, and
critiqued in countless scholarly articles.2 There have been confer
ences centered on his work, classes taught on his writings, and fo
rums populated with his criticisms even after his death in 2002.3 In
his work, Illich offered a critique on the modernization of our social
institutions and unabashedly offered unpopular and controversial
solutions to what he deemed to be the problems in a move toward a
capitalist world. Most notably, no area of society is saved from his
* Dr. Bridgette Baldwin is a Professor of Law at Western New England
University School of Law. I would like to express a debt of gratitude to the organizers
of the Illich Symposium hosted by Western New England University for inviting me to
present these ideas, and also to the Western New England Law Review. I would also
like to thank Francis Fox Piven, Dean Martha Davis, Robin Chandler, and Davarian
Baldwin for helpful insights, comments, and criticism on early drafts of this paper.
1. A significant portion of this Article is excerpted from the author’s Ph.D.
dissertation. See Bridgette Baldwin, Wisconsin Works? Race, Gender and
Accountability in the Workfare Era (Jan. 1, 2010) (Ph.D. dissertation, Northeastern
University), available at http://iris.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context
=law_pol_soc_diss. Specifically, portions of this article are excerpted from the
following pages of the author’s dissertation: 141-44, 156-57, 175-78, 218-19, 233, 235-38,
240-41, 244-45, 248-52, 254-63, and 269-70.
2. See generally DAVID CAYLEY, THE RIVERS NORTH OF THE FUTURE: THE TES
TAMENT OF IVAN ILLICH (2005); THE CHALLENGES OF IVAN ILLICH: A COLLECTIVE
REFLECTION (Lee Hoinacki & Carl Mitcham, eds., 2002); DAVID HORROBIN, MEDICAL
HUBRIS: REPLY TO IVAN ILLICH (1978); Richard Kahn & Douglas Keller, Paulo Freire
and Ivan Illich: Technology, Politics and the Reconstruction of Education, 5.4 POL’Y
FUTURES EDUC. 431 (2007); Peter L. Berger, Rembering Ivan Illich, FIRST THINGS
(Mar. 2003), www.firstthings.com/issue/2003/03/march.
3. See generally IVAN ILLICH LEARNING WEB, http://ivan-illich.org/ (last visited
May 24, 2012); IVAN ILLICH LISTSERV, mail.ivan-illich.org/mailman/listinfo/illich_sig_
ivan-illich.org (last visited May 24, 2012); Ivan Illich Writing on the Web, PRESERVA
TION INST., www.preservenet.com/theory/Illich.html (last visited May 24, 2012). The In
ternational Journal of Illich Studies released its first issue in 2009 and is a journal that
focuses on the writings and contemporary wisdom of Ivan Illich. See INT’L J. ILLICH
STUD., available at http://ivan-illich.org/journal/index.php/IJIS/index.
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critique.4 This Article attempts to fuse Illich’s misplaced ideas of
gender roles with how privatization of welfare services in Wisconsin
under the Wisconsin Works program (W-2) has legitimized shadow
economy and work through mandated community service jobs. The
way in which W-2 mothers and their conditions are an index for a
shift in capitalist social relations in this age of neo-liberalism. The
conditions of W-2 mothers dovetail nicely with, but also, powerfully
exceed, the diagnosis of social relations that Illich encapsulates as
shadow work. In the most general sense, neo-liberalism’s focus on
privatization5 has ushered in the shrinkage of a robust welfare state
and all the institutions that go along with it. However, W-2 mothers
reveal the shadows of this new private economy where we find ac
tually not a diminished state, but instead the transference of power
facilitated by the state to private interests. In this particular case,
welfare reform has converted what was once compensated, al
though low, or more readily identifiable forms of labor into the cat
egories of apprenticeship training and/or community service. The
effects of this transference has in fact generated a new market of
relative prosperity whereby the community service acts of welfare
mothers en route to jobs that will most likely keep them below the
poverty line has helped subsidize a wide ranging market of subcon
tracted not-for-profit and for-profit W-2 agencies that benefit from
the shadow work of these women. And it is through welfare
mothers that we can see the powerful converges between gender,
labor, and privatization in the new economy.
What, then, is shadow work according to Ivan Illich? In his
1981 collection of essays entitled Shadow Work,6 Illich describes
4. See generally IVAN ILLICH, DESCHOOLING SOCIETY (Ruth Nanda Anshen ed.,
Haroer & Row 1971); IVAN D. ILLICH, ENERGY AND EQUITY (Calder & Boyars 1974);
IVAN ILLICH, GENDER, (1982); IVAN ILLICH, SHADOW WORK (1981); IVAN ILLICH, LIM
ITS TO MEDICINE: MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE EXPROPRIATION OF HEALTH (Marion Bo
yars 2002) (1975).
5. Privatization of welfare is an initiative to introduce market relationships into
the bureaucratic production of public services where a standard of social justice is re
placed by an ethos of economic costs and benefits. With W-2, the state facilitated a
system of privatization where counties became subcontractors in order to secure a mar
ket share of the welfare administration. This process of privatization created a system
where welfare mothers were unclear about competing regulation and violations of pol
icy, social workers were replaced by Financial and Employment Planners (FEPs), and
all actors involved were subjected to a new set of market-based criteria that encouraged
antagonism over service provision within the daily realities of public aid. See DAVID
HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2007); LISA DUGGAN, THE TWILIGHT
OF EQUALITY?: NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL POLITICS AND THE ATTACK ON DEMOC
RACY (2004).
6. ILLICH, SHADOW WORK, supra note 4.

2012] PRIVATIZATION OF WELFARE AND ALTERNATIVE MARKETS

447

unpaid work that complements wage labor as shadow work. He
states:
It comprises most housework women do in their homes and
apartments, the activities connected with shopping, most of the
homework of students cramming for exams, the toil expended
commuting to and from the job. It includes the stress of forced
consumption, the tedious and regimented surrender to therapists,
compliance with bureaucrats, the preparation for work to which
one is compelled, and many of the activities usually labeled “fam
ily life.”7

Therefore, according to Illich, shadow work is the unpaid work that
society performs in preparation for consumption. It is the extra
work required by industrial capitalism beyond subsistence. But this
type of labor is more than mere preparation; he asserts that it is a
series of coerced acts and practices that we are compelled to per
form within the late capitalist system, i.e. capitalism after factories.8
Prior to 1996, mothers and their children had the limited and
continually contested safety net of the Aid to Families with Depen
dent Children program (AFDC).9 But with Wisconsin leading the
charge for welfare reform, many single mothers were left struggling
to negotiate the varied requirements of the new program, W-2,
while at the same time laboring over how to provide the basic needs
for their children. This Article, through the voices of welfare
mothers, will present an alternate lens through which to see how
community service jobs (CSJs) and the privatization of social ser
vices shift economic resources from the state to market interests.
Therefore, within the logic of the marketplace and the self-service
economy, services which had once been considered waged labor are
now reassigned value as acts of community service. Additionally,
this Article will unpack how privatization has not simply created
shadow work but has generated an entire shadow market, where
the state transfers wealth and resources to private companies with
out the traditional economic parameters of competition.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Before AFDC was enacted through the Social Security Act of
1935 and the birth of the New Deal, most, if not all, social services
7. Id. at 100.
8. Id.
9. SHELDON H. DANZIGER, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
(1999).

AND

WELFARE REFORM 2
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were handled by private religious and charitable organizations.10
However, with the onset of the Great Depression and because of
the economic crisis affecting private religious and charitable organi
zations, the state and local governments began to provide public
funding for social services. In the 1960s, we witnessed an overhaul
of government funding for social services and this increase in partic
ipation by the government continued until the mid-1990s with the
introduction and implementation of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)11 and block
grants. However, most particularly, in recent years the federal gov
ernment has withdrawn federal entitlements to fund state welfare
programs.12 In its place, the private sector has reinvented itself and
reemerged as the leader in providing welfare services to indigent
clients.13 The federal government has divested its interest in pro
viding for the poor and has offered significant contracts to for-profit
and non-profit agencies for a variety of social services.14
Under AFDC, the state paid more attention to the conditions
for eligibility (i.e., the man-in-the-house rule and residency require
ments, etc.).15 With the advent of welfare reform, the focus shifted
away from examining who was eligible for social services to deter
10. M. BRYNA SANGER, THE WELFARE MARKETPLACE: PRIVATIZATION AND
WELFARE REFORM 13 (2003). See generally STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH & MICHAEL LIP
SKY, Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting (1993).
11. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C., 8 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
12. When welfare changed from AFDC to PRWORA in 1996, much of the fed
eral funding was consolidated into a Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
block grant. Once a grant amount has been determined, this amount is fixed for
upwards of six years. Within this time period, the amount will not change. By example,
the amount that is calculated for the block grant during the FFY 1996-2002 was calcu
lated based on the highest amount received by a state from either, “(1) the average of
AFDC-related funding to the state for FFY 1992 through 1994, (2) AFDC-related
amounts paid to the state in FFY 1994, or (3) 4/3 of AFDC-related amounts paid to the
state in the first three quarters of FFY 1995.” JACOB ALEX KLERMAN ET AL., WEL
FARE REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: STATE AND COUNTY IMPLEMENTATION OF CALWORKS
IN THE SECOND YEAR 359 (2001), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1177.pdf. States are required to contribute at least
75% to 80% of what it spent the prior year on its welfare program. This contribution is
based on whether the state met the federal work requirement. Additionally, if a state
fails to comply with federal standards, the TANF grant will be reduced by up to 5%. Id.
at 360-61.
13. SMITH & LIPSKY, supra note 10, at 11.
14. Id. at 17.
15. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969), overruled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1974); King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334-35 (1968).
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mining how to make as many people as possible ineligible by em
phasizing the need to work.16 Diversion programs were created, or
in states like Wisconsin, accelerated, to de-emphasize welfare cash
assistance and situate applicants within employment opportuni
ties.17 In fact, under the new law, states were required to report a
ninety-percent rate of employment for families receiving assistance
under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block
grants in 2002.18 This mandate by the federal government en
couraged a convergence between public and private institutions in
solving the “welfare problem.” Moreover, the public outcry against
the reported years of public assistance program mismanagement
under AFDC suggested that perhaps charitable and private organi
zations could better meet the employment demands of the rising
welfare roll.19
Scholars contend that local and state governments have stead
ily contracted out services because of dissatisfaction with the wel
fare system under AFDC, the implementation of welfare reform
and the passage of PRWORA, and cynicism over whether the state
and local governments could adequately perform effectively under
the new program.20 Before the enactment of PRWORA, critical
scholars argued that the current welfare system under AFDC cre
ated dependent recipients without any motivation to be indepen
dent and economically self-sufficient.21 Therefore, changing
“welfare as we know it” not only meant changing the structure of
welfare, but also re-organizing who would run the program. With
this view, allowing private for-profit or non-profit organizations to
take a turn at running the program would introduce a new effi
ciency and productivity not just to the women receiving welfare, but
16. David Ellwood, Welfare Reform as I Knew It: When Bad Things Happen to
Good Policies, PROSPECT.ORG (Nov. 19, 2001), http://prospect.org/article/welfare-re
form-i-knew-it-when-bad-things-happen-good-policies.
17. John A. Wagner, Welfare Spending in Milwaukee County: “Where Does the
Money Go?”, 5.2 WIS. POL’Y RES. INST. REP. 13 (Mar. 1992) available at http://www.
wpri.org/Reports/Volume%205/Vol5No2.pdf.
18. CHILDREN’S WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, CWLA 2005 Children’s Legis
lative Agenda, CWLA.ORG, http://www.cwla.org/advocacy/2005legagenda16.htm (last
visited May 24, 2012). PRWORA replaced AFDC with TANF on July 1, 1997. U.S.
Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of
TANF Recipients, HHS.GOV (July-Sept. 1997), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/
character/fy97/revsum.htm.
19. SANGER, supra note 10, at 17.
20. Id. at 23-24; see also MARY JO BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE RE
ALITIES: FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM (1994).
21. BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 20, at 67.
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to the program itself by simply getting women off the rolls.22 Fur
ther, the federal government no longer matched state spending on
welfare, and states were now given a set amount of money under
the TANF block grant system.23 Therefore, it was in the best inter
est of the state to create a more efficient and cost-effective system
under the new law. In fact, the passage of PRWORA spawned a
new interest in privatizing social services.24 The privatization of so
cial services, if administered properly, could benefit fiscally
strapped states by shifting some of their public burden onto private
companies in ways that provide a new infusion of federal funds
without federal oversight or state responsibility for a growing pov
erty class.
Wisconsin was able to privatize its W-2 program through waiv
ers even before PRWORA became law.25 When welfare services
were under the auspices of AFDC, the state and local governments
of Wisconsin controlled access to the services and determined the
rules of eligibility. With the creation of the W-2 program, however,
the state of Wisconsin offered the program up for sale to the high
est and most efficient bidder.26 To this end, the W-2 program of
fered contracts to private agencies to determine eligibility
determinations and control case management services, employment
placement, and all other welfare-related services.27 The state of
Wisconsin solicited Request for Proposals (RFP), particularly in
Milwaukee County, from private for-profit or non-profit agencies.28
In Milwaukee County, the local government was also allowed to
submit an RFP to compete with private agencies. However, the

22. Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion
and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1127 (2000).
23. KLERMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 359.
24. PAMELA WINSTON ET AL., PRIVATIZATION OF WELFARE SERVICES: A RE
VIEW OF LITERATURE 3 (May 2002), available at http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/
pdfs/privatization.pdf.
25. Carol Harvey et al., Evaluating Welfare Reform Waivers Under Section 1115,
14.4 J. ECON. PERSP., 165, 167 (Fall 2000), available at http://test.aeaweb.org/jep/
archive/1404/14040165.pdf.
26. REBECCA SWARTZ ET AL., W-2 CONVERTING TO WISCONSIN WORKS: WHERE
DID FAMILIES GO WHEN AFDC ENDED IN MILWAUKEE? 9 (1999), available at http://
www.mathematica-mpr.com/PDFs/w2report.pdf.
27. DAVID DODENHOFF, PRIVATIZATION WORKS: A STUDY OF THE PRIVATE AD
MINISTRATION OF THE WISCONSIN WORKS WELFARE REFORM PROGRAM 4 (2002),
available at http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/privatization_works.pdf.
28. Id. at 5.
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county declined.29 Hence, the W-2 Program in Milwaukee became,
in all senses of the word, private.30
The figure below briefly outlines the administrative effects of
privatizing welfare services.
FIGURE 1: SERVICES PRIVATIZED

Case Management:
intake and diversion
activities, Eligibility,
case monitoring and
tracking, and sanctions
for noncompliance.

UNDER

PRWORA (AND W-2)31

Employment Services:
job search and
placement assistance,
work experience,
education, and training.

Support Services:
Child care,
transportation,
mental health,
substance abuse
treatment and
domestic violence
counseling.

Wisconsin and Milwaukee County, in particular, allow both
for-profit and not-for-profit organizations to administer W-2 pro
grams.32 In Milwaukee County, there have been at least five orga
29. The state of Wisconsin gave each county the opportunity to have the first
right of refusal to administer the W-2 program if they met certain requirements, includ
ing caseload reductions. Counties that met those requirements were allowed to admin
ister the program without participating in the bidding process. Those, including
Milwaukee County, which did not meet the requirements, would have to submit a com
petitive bid. See id. at 4-5.
30. STATE OF WIS. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, ADMINISTRATION OF THE WIS
CONSIN WORKS PROGRAM BY OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTER OF
GREATER MILWAUKEE, INC. (2004), available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lab/reports/
04-OIC_ltr.pdf.
31. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-41, SOCIAL
SERVICE PRIVATIZATION: ETHICS AND ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGES IN STATE
CONTRACTING (Apr. 1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99041.pdf;
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-87, PRIVATIZATION: QUESTIONS
STATE AND LOCAL DECISIONMAKERS USED WHEN CONSIDERING PRIVATIZATION
OPTIONS. (Apr. 1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/gg98087.pdf.
32. STATE OF WIS. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, supra note 30, at 1, 8.
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nizations awarded contracts to run W-2 agencies: Goodwill
Industries, Opportunities Industrialization Center of Greater Mil
waukee (OIC-GM), United Migrant Opportunity Services
(UMOS), YW-Works, and Maximus.33 In 2004, OIC-GM was the
largest provider of W-2 services in the state of Wisconsin.34 Over
fifty percent of clients enrolled in W-2 were assigned to the region
in which OIC-GM was responsible.35 OIC-GM is a community
based non-profit organization, providing services to the low-income
community in Milwaukee County.36 OIC-GM was awarded its first
contract as a W-2 provider in 1997.37 In 2005 at the time of this
study UMOS was the largest provider for W-2 clients in the state of
Wisconsin. UMOS is a private non-profit organization which offers
employment and job training services to the largely Latino migrant
community in Milwaukee. In 1997, UMOS received a three-year
contract from the State of Wisconsin to operate the W-2 program.38
YW-Works is a community-based for-profit organization created by
the YWCA, Kaiser Group, and CNR Health, Inc. in 1997.39 That
same year, YW-Works was awarded a contract to administer the W
2 program. In 2003, YW-Works serviced roughly 1,700 W-2 cli
ents.40 Lastly, Maximus is a nation-wide for-profit organization
that was awarded a contract to administer the W-2 program in Mil
waukee County in 1997.41 All of these organizations were given the
autonomy to administer the program in the way that they deemed
appropriate.
II. COMMUNITY SERVICE, JOB SEARCH,

AND

SHADOW WORK

The goal of W-2 is to assist individuals in finding employment.
Unlike its predecessor, if an applicant is eligible for W-2 services,
the applicant will be placed into one of four “self-sufficiency” place
ment areas.42 The goal of W-2 is to move each participant up the
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Brief History of UMOS, UMOS, http://www.umos.org/corporate/history.html
(last visited May 24, 2012).
39. DODENHOFF, supra note 27, at 5.
40. There were over 9000 W-2 clients in Milwaukee County. MICHAEL D. TAN
NER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE: HELPING OTHERS IN CIVIL SOCIETY (2002).
41. DODENHOFF, supra note 27, at 5.
42. W-2, WISCONSIN WORKS, 6-7 (1996), available at http://content.wisconsinhistory.org/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/tp&CISOPTR=49223&CISOSHOW=
49207 (last visited May 24, 2012).
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self-sufficiency ladder until they are no longer receiving subsidized
employment.43 The first and most desirable placement is unsub
sidized employment.44 All W-2 applicants will be considered for
this placement area.45 At this level, a participant is considered “job
ready” and will receive services geared toward attaining employ
ment.46 This level places an emphasis on work first and furthers
employment over other worthy endeavors such as extended educa
tion or training opportunities.47
The next placement area is Trial Jobs or subsidized employ
ment.48 In this placement, a participant is given a temporary job
earning at least the minimum wage in order to gain work experi
ence and training.49 Participants are paid by the employer.50 This
particular placement is beneficial to the employer because the em
ployer receives a bonus fee per month from the state for every W-2
participant in the Trial Job placement.51 Another job placement
area is called W-2 Transitions (W-2T).52 Participants with signifi
cant barriers to both private and community service employment
are placed in this subsidized placement.53 Most participants in this
placement level are not considered “job ready” and may have disa
bilities relating to physical, mental, or cognitive limitations, drug
dependency issues, or learning disabilities.54 Additionally, partici
pants in this category may have the primary responsibility to care
for a dependent that is disabled.55
One other placement level mandates that its recipients engage
in shadow work.56 In CSJs, W-2 participants volunteer at various
non-profit organizations around the city in order to gain work expe
rience and training.57 While participants are placed in CSJs and
43. Id. at 7; WIS. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, WISCONSIN WORKS (W-2)
MANUAL, ch. 1.1.2 (Apr. 7, 2011), available at http://dcf.wisconsin.gov/w2/manual/
whnjs.htm. [hereinafter W-2 Manual].
44. W-2 Manual, supra note 43, at ch. 7:1.0.
45. Id.
46. Id. at ch. 7.3.0.
47. W-2, WISCONSIN WORKS, supra note 42, at 6.
48. Id.
49. W-2 Manual, supra note 43, at ch. 7.3.8.
50. Id. at ch. 10.1.
51. See id. at ch. 7.3.3, 10.1.
52. Id. at ch. 7.4.2.
53. See id. at ch. 7.4.2.2.
54. See id. at ch. 7.4.2.1.
55. Id.
56. Id. at ch. 7.4.1.
57. Id. at ch. 7.4.1.3.
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each job requires varying degrees of skill development and task
output, all participants receive cash assistance in the amount of
$673.58 CSJs may consist of a number of volunteer opportunities
including government, charitable, private non-charitable organiza
tions and private for-profit organizations.59 Additionally, a partici
pant placed in this level may also be given certain other activities
designed to increase training or education.60 Such additional activi
ties may include classes towards obtaining a GED, basic adult
higher education courses, training for employment, and English as a
Second Language (ESL) classes.61 Participants who are unable to
get a job without additional education may also attend technical
community colleges for up to two years as acceptable CSJ activi
ties.62 However, it is important to note that the W-2 program
stresses minimal educational attainment until the participant has
succeeded in reaching self-sufficiency in the workforce arena, and,
therefore, attending school in lieu of volunteer activities is at the
discretion of the FEP.63 Additionally, the participant would still be
required to perform twenty-five hours per week of CSJ activities
and attend ten hours per week of class activities.64
The goal of the CSJ placement is to give the participant enough
training to eventually place them in some sort of unsubsidized em
ployment in the private employment sector.65 Most individuals
placed at this level have never been employed, and, therefore, lack
the work habits and skills necessary to compete in the private
workforce arena. Hence, CSJs are designed to mirror private em
ployment opportunities but without private employment compensa
tion. CSJs are designed to teach life skills to the previously
unemployed, as participants are taught “valuable work habits and
work socialization skills which all employers require from their
workers.”66 Participants are also taught reliability and work ethic,
as well as how to be a team player.67 Each CSJ maintains slots
58. W-2, WISCONSIN WORKS, supra note 42, at 6; W-2 Manual, supra note 43, at
ch. 7.4.1.9.
59. W-2 Manual, supra note 43, at ch. 7.4.1.3.
60. Id. at ch. 7.4.1.2.
61. Id. at ch. 7.4.1.7.
62. Id. at ch. 7.4.1.7.1.
63. Id. at ch. 8.1, 6.1.
64. Id. at ch. 8.3.2.5.
65. W-2, WISCONSIN WORKS, supra note 42, at 6.
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id.
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specifically designated for W-2 participants and does not, therefore,
replace existing employees with W-2 workers.68
Community service requirements are a form of uncompensated
labor, but yet are vital to sustaining the profitability of the W-2
economy, and constitute an important yet under-examined site of
shadow work. This section looks at how a system of welfare priva
tization has affected the lives of African-American women by shift
ing economic resources from the state to market interest through
reassignment of previously compensated labor as CSJs.
W-2 policy and procedures presumes that W-2 recipients
should be placed in apprenticeships so that they can learn how to
work. The ritualistic understanding is that the reason these women
are poor is because they do not have work habits or work skills.
Therefore, they are placed in “work” opportunities and much is re
quired of them in order to develop work habits and work skills.
The trivial nature of the “work” opportunity is irrelevant; this op
portunity is supposed to benefit the recipient by helping her de
velop good work habits. Ann, one of the participants in this study
and a W-2 recipient, challenges such assumptions about her work
ethic.
Ok so I have not had a job in a number of years because under
AFDC you did not have to work. I mean you could work, but
your check was not going to be as high if you did. But under this
new W-2 they have you working your butt off, doing this and
doing that. They assume that since I have not worked it means
that I can’t work, that I don’t know how to handle a job. So they
set me up doing things at the Goodwill and I ain’t knocking no
body that work at the Goodwill, but working there making what
W-2 gives me ain’t gonna keep me afloat for too long. I need
some training in something that I like, not simply having me
work, for work you know just for working. And they want you to
do so much for so little. In the beginning before you see any of
they money, you out there day after day bringing in slips to them
for no reason. This is what they call the trial period—trial period
for what? To see how long you can make me do this dog and
pony show? It ain’t helping me get a job it’s just busy work plain
and simple. They expect more from us as poor mothers because
we are poor, no one gonna stand up for us, no one cares about
people on welfare. Not W-2, not FEP workers and not the jobs
they send us to. They just want to humiliate us to the point
68.

Id.
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where we don’t want to use the system or better yet, work us to
death, right. Well I guess I need to work, right.69

Here, W-2 creates a subsidized labor force based on the pre
sumption that work, even meaningless and menial tasks, establishes
job-readiness for “welfare queens.” The illusion is that these wo
men on W-2 are unemployed because they lack skill training; there
fore, the menial tasks and shadow work ultimately make them
ready for legitimate wage labor. But the reality is that the jobs
available to these women do not provide opportunities for advance
ment, and, instead, either keep them complacent and dependent,
or, at best, completely regulated within a shadow market. The pa
ternalistic essentialist70 viewpoint sheds light on this phenomenon.
This approach endorses a situation where these women are man
aged into scripted scenarios of not only what training is appropriate
but also under what circumstances any sort of training will be pro
vided. The agenda here is clear: so long as these women are placed
in any work condition, they will be trained to survive, and, thus,
move into self-sufficient roles. However, the reality is that without
technical skills or educational training, these women could continue
to be constrained to the bottom rung of the economic ladder.
W-2’s Work First initiative encourages the placement of most
participants into volunteer jobs.71 These volunteer jobs rarely lead
to permanent employment because they are meant to be temporary
placement activities in order to give recipients without a work his
tory some work experience. Most CSJs last for six months and can
be extended for an additional three months.72 If the CSJ chooses
not to hire the W-2 recipient, the recipient is placed into another
69. Interview with Ann, a W-2 recipient (2005).
70. In the context of welfare discourse, the term “paternalistic essentialism” sug
gests that there exists a predetermined construct of a welfare mother profile, which
presumes the specific characteristics or behaviors unique to the welfare poor. Those
who marshal a paternalistic essentialist position then assume that every member of the
welfare poor is of one particular social type that the state will govern irrespective of
multi-faceted personal choices and challenges. The profile of this essential welfare be
ing goes on to shroud the complexities of welfare experiences under an imagined carica
ture no matter who the person is or what that person’s particular circumstance may be.
This portrait of the poor, thus, serves as justification for state or market actors to make
decisions on behalf of the poor with little concern for their personal wishes, interests, or
even needs.
71. Interview by author with FEP Worker (2005). See generally WISCONSIN POL
ICY INSTITUTE REPORT, WISCONSIN WORKS: ONLY WORK SHOULD PAY (2004), availa
ble at http://www.wpri.org/Reports/Volume16/Vol16no7.pdf.
72. See W-2, WISCONSIN WORKS, supra note 42, at 6, 10.
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CSJ position.73 Changing CSJ positions will continue until the re
cipient has reached the maximum allowable time limit in the CSJ
employment position.74 Many of the mothers are shifted from one
site to another without any real stability in employment or actual
opportunities in skill building or training.
It is also important to note that it is irrelevant, as far as W-2 is
concerned, that the actual W-2 placement may not have matched
the skill of the individual or even the desire of the participant. One
such individual, Naomi, observes, “All they care about is placing
me in busy work. They don’t care what type of CSJ I’m in. I’ve
sorted hangers, put glue packs together and worked at that filthy
food pantry. And what do I have to show for it, nothing but a kick
in the butt.”75 In the end, the only thing that matters for W-2 com
pliance is that the recipient is engaged in some type of volunteer
work, of any kind, and the assumption is that this quasi-labor will
engender a good work ethic assumed to be missing from recipients.
However, recipients counter that in order to make W-2 work, job
opportunities must be offered that lead to permanent employment.
While any type of employment may be the philosophy of the W-2
mission statement, desires for a higher quality of life call for em
ployment opportunities which will do much more than move unem
ployed recipients into the category of the working poor.
Employment opportunities must be tailored to meet the goals and
abilities of the individual recipient.
Within a capitalist social order, we understand that there are
gradations of class status predicated on one’s labor power and the
ability to sell this labor power within the opportunities available in
a given market. Therefore, those at the bottom rung sit there be
cause their labor power is not regarded as highly valuable within
the existing marketplace. However, paternalistic essentialism in
serts an added wrinkle to the meaning and structure of class differ
ence. Not only are those on welfare in poverty because they have
not accumulated wealth and skills, but also they are seen as perpet
ual children, lacking the capacity to develop the skills that can gen
erate the potential for class mobility. Paternalist essentialism
makes poverty sit beyond the realm of politics, i.e., something that
can be struggled over, as a product of social inequality or something
that can be changed. For those surviving under welfare, poverty is
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8, 10.
Interview by author with Naomi, a W-2 recipient (2005).
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not deemed a social fact, but is marked as a behavioral dysfunction,
a choice to opt-out of the normal functioning of civil society.
Therefore, when no volunteer opportunities are available, recipi
ents are placed in job search activities. Another individual, Tracy,
who has experienced the system first-hand, confirms this reality:
My first experience with the job search was so embarrassing.
You know we have to go out every day for a certain amount of
hours to look for a job . . . . I actually went to the Job Center and
got on the computer and started looking for places that I can
work at. Some places you can, you know, give them the applica
tion through the computer but other places you have to go there.
So whenever I had to go to a place, I had to give this paper to
sign. It was so embarrassing because you know they not going to
look at you seriously if you give them W-2 paper and the second
thing is that now they know you on W-2. I felt like I was back in
school and having to bring home a note to my momma to sign. I
did that for one or two days and then I started pulling them just
on the newspaper and signing myself. No one checked but even
having to do it one time was so stupid. And you know they make
us do that because they don’t think we have enough sense to get
a job.76

This experience of looking for jobs as a training exercise shows that
W-2 training has little to do with any actually existing market;
rather, it is structured based on a set of ideas about mothers as dys
functional laborers. Additionally, this job search is a form of un
paid labor. W-2 recipients are required to engage in this type of
labor before determination of eligibility.77 Therefore, in the most
classical sense, this type of “unpaid servitude” epitomizes Illich’s
characterization of shadow work.78 Many mothers clearly exper
ienced the futility of this exercise, but also likely understood that
the true goal of this job seeking exercise was to train mothers in the
basic skill of compliance.
As the reform-based policy was emerging, it constructed a set
of parameters, guidelines, and sanctions based on an ideal-type: the
welfare queen that had been demonized in public discourse. Before
actual mothers can traverse the arduous path from poverty to selfreliance, they are forced to fight through the long shadow cast by
the welfare queen type. This is more than a metaphorical illusion,
as the welfare queen became the benchmark for policymaking.
76.
77.
78.

Interview by author with Tracy, a W-2 recipient (2005).
Interview by author with FEP Worker (2005).
See generally ILLICH, SHADOW WORK, supra note 4.
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Sanctions are instituted based on the presumption of the mother’s
inherent deceptiveness. Work requirements are designed based on
her inherent laziness, and skill-building exercises are crafted to
counteract a presumed inability for job readiness.79 Even low-skill
busy work is valorized as noble based on the presumption that a
mother’s unemployment is the product of not only bad choices, but
also poor job skills, instead of a paltry market.80 Therefore, an ac
tual mother’s protest against such policies confirms her challenges
to work and does not challenge the welfare system as is it currently
constructed.
III. PRIVATIZATION

OF

SHADOW WORK81

When market relationships were introduced into the bureau
cratic production of public services, the program moved from a
standard of social justice to a logic of costs and benefits. In Milwau
kee County alone, there have been at least five agencies holding
contracts to administer the W-2 Program.82 Some organizations
have been not-for-profit while others are for-profit. In the case of
the for-profit business, the organization expects to increase its reve
nue. This profit-driven orientation motivates agencies such as YWWorks or Maximus to accept contracts to administer W-2 services.
Private companies want to stay in business; therefore, they engage
79. See MARC V. LEVINE, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE CENTER FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE CRISIS DEEPENS: BLACK MALE JOBLESSNESS IN MIL
WAUKEE 2009 (2010), available at http://www4.uwm.edu/ced/publications/blackjobless
ness_2010.pdf; UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING
INSTITUTE, SOCIO-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF NEIGHBORHOOD ISSUES FACING MILWAU
KEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS STUDENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES (2009), available at http://www4.
uwm.edu/eti/2009/MilwaukeeSocioEconomicAnalysis.pdf; DEVAH PAGER, MARKED:
RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION (2009).
80. From 2003-05, Black Americans represented 6% of the population in Wiscon
sin yet 48% of the black families lived in poverty, 10.9% of black adults were unem
ployed, and 17.1% of black adults were under-employed. Additionally, black women
earned $4.11 less than white men. CENTER ON WISCONSIN STRATEGY, BLACK WISCON
SINITES AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 2 (2007), available at http://www.cows.org/pdf/
ds-blackwisconsites_011107.pdf (last visited May 24, 2012).
81. Here I focus on the most common understanding of privatization, in which a
government offers contracts to private organizations for services traditionally
performed by local or state agencies. In some circumstances, this can include local and
state participation, but in most cases, the government has completely turned the reigns
of what were previously welfare services over to private agencies. At the heart of
privatization is the idea that market-based competition among for-profit agencies will
increase the quality of services.
82. SWARTZ, ET AL., supra note 26, at 1 (“As the result of a competitive con
tracting process, five private agencies provide W–2 assistance in the state’s largest met
ropolitan area, Milwaukee County.”).
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FIGURE 2: MILWAUKEE W-2 REGIONS MAP83

Milwaukee W-2 Regions Map
Northeast

Effective
January 1, 2006

CMA - YWCA
JDPA - Policy Studies Inc. (PSI)

Northwest
76th Street

Mill Road

CMA - MAXIMUS, Inc.
JDPA - Policy Studies, Inc. (PSI)
6th/Port Washington Road

Villard Street

Central
CMA - UMOS
JDPA - UMOS
Locust Street

Brown Street

CMA & JDPA Sites

Milwaukee/Vliet Streets

Northwest - 6550 N. 76th St.
Northeast - 1915 N. Martin Luther King Dr.
Menomonee River

Southeast - 2701 S. Chase Ave.
Southwest - 1304 S. 70th St.
Central - 4030 N. 29th St.

27th Street

Southwest
CMA - MAXIMUS, Inc.
JDPA - MAXIMUS, Inc.

Southeast
CMA - UMOS
JDPA - UMOS

CMA - Case Management Agency
JDPA - Job Development
Placement Agency

Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, Bureau of Workforce Information
Date prepared: 1/30/2007
File: S:\DWS\Bwi\ArcGIS\Heather\MILW_2006regions_offices_new names_sites_06-09D.mxd

83. WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, BUREAU OF
WORKFORCE INFORMATION, MILWAUKEE W-2 REGIONS MAP (Jan. 30, 2007), available
at http://dcf.wisconsin.gov/w2/pdf/milwaukee_w2_regions_map_2006_2009.pdf.
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in behavior that will generate the most profit. They attempt to es
tablish reputations in the community to attract consumers by train
ing their employees in both the skills needed to operate the
company and perform customer service. They stand by their prod
ucts or services with eye-appealing advertisements and quality con
trol guarantees. In most cases, it is assumed and understood that a
market-based approach assures competition, which in turn gener
ates a climate for efficiency and productivity. However, in the cur
rent formation of the workfare era and the creation of W-2, this is
not the case. Within Milwaukee County’s existing W-2 structure,
there are not a number of for-profit welfare service providers com
peting against one another for client loyalty.84
Of the five agencies holding contracts for W-2, only two, YWWorks and Maximus, are for-profit organizations. However, be
cause of the zoning of participants, YW-works will never have to
compete with Maximus for clients. In fact, what we witness with W
2 is the classic monopoly system. The current formation of the W-2
program assigns one single institution to an area of town known as
a zone within the welfare system.85 Therefore, if you are a W-2
client within a particular zone you only have one option for service,
good or bad. The end result, despite appeals to a competitive and
efficient W-2 program under capitalism, generates a monopoly en
vironment that heightens callousness and evades accountability.
The way in which an agency secures its hold on the market is
by facilitating a relationship between the community service labor
of W-2 mothers, (i.e., their shadow work) and the sub-contracted
needs of the state (i.e. the workfare agency). In this tripartite rela
tionship, the value of the sub-contracted institution is predicated on
its ability to manage the shadow labor of welfare mothers. In ex
change for that relationship, the institutions are provided with con
tinual contracts from the state.86 But what is even more explosive
about this revelation is that not only does each agency have a mo
nopoly of clientele among the W-2 recipients, but they are also ben
efitting from a shadow market.
84. SWARTZ, ET AL., supra note 26, at 1.
85. See supra Figure 2.
86. DAVID DODENHOFF, PRIVATIZATION WORKS: A STUDY OF PRIVATE ADMIN
ISTRATION OF WISCONSIN WORKS WELFARE REFORM PROGRAM 4-6 (2002), available at
http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/privatization_works.pdf (explaining that Wis
consin established “caseload reduction, job placement, and AFDC expenditure targets
for the counties” that, if met annually, would lead to a renewed contract).
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In the private business arena, the presumption is that busi
nesses will produce the most efficient products or services in ways
that simultaneously maximize their profit margins. The observa
tions here are not meant to suggest that governmental control
would necessarily produce greater efficiency. But under the model
of public aid, cost-efficiency and profit should not be the
benchmarks. Moreover, a public aid approach would leave open
the possibility to hold decisions up to the scrutiny of a citizenry, the
voting power of both state residents and recipients, as opposed to
simply the limited interest of a board of trustees or the laws of a
workfare market that is itself maintained by taxpayer dollars.
The end result in Wisconsin’s privatized regimen is that the
lack of competition produces an inferior product without market
place consequences, but with overwhelming marketplace benefits.
Under a profit-driven model, there is no longer the social program
ming image or focus, where help is given based on need. Instead
the market-based approach requires W-2 agencies to market them
selves as being profitable or efficient in getting clients off the
rolls—even if the goal originally was to help those in need. To be
sure, welfare is big business, but not for the proverbial welfare
queen with multiple children that we caricature as getting rich off
the rolls. Here, the gross accumulation of wealth is reserved for the
subcontracting agencies. For example, Maximus has been awarded
contracts as the administrator of W-2 with a value in excess of
$107.7 million.87
Not only do we see welfare converted to a large money making
industry but the method by which money is generated may also
cause one to pause. Helping those in need does not generate profit,
but under W-2 there is in fact a range of economic incentives. Indi
vidual service workers receive bonuses and contracted employers
receive cash benefits based on shrinking the rolls. The general ar
gument is that workfare is designed to transition welfare mothers
from the status of welfare dependency to labor self-sufficiency.
However, the underside of this story, in the shadows of W-2 policy,
lurks a hidden, yet effective, strategy for extracting labor and profit
from these mothers without reciprocation. The consequence of
mandated community service along the W-2 ladder prevents clients
from gaining skills from upper mobility and education possibilities,
and it relegates these women to reserve labor force status. Ulti
87.
SIN.GOV,

Administration of the Wisconsin Works Program by Maximus, Inc., WISCON
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/reports/maximus.pdf (last visited May 24, 2012).
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mately, women can remain stuck on the community service rung of
the ladder throughout their tenure with W-2, while the agencies
benefit and profit from the numerical existence of W-2 mothers on
the roll. This subtle approach encourages welfare to be solely an
initiative to eliminate the rolls without any concern for skill build
ing. The following figure may not entirely speak for itself, but says
volumes about the gross shift in the approach to welfare based on
the rapid decline in the rolls after the rise of the for-profit
paradigm.
FIGURE 3: TOTAL AFDC/W-2

CASES WITH A CASH BENEFIT.88

88. KIM SWISSDORF, KATE MAGUIRE & MARLIA MOORE, WISCONSIN
LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, INFORMATIONAL PAPER 46: WISCONSIN WORKS (W-2)
AND OTHER ECONOMIC SUPPORT PROGRAMS 43 (2007), available at http://legis.
wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications/Informational-Papers/Documents/2007/46.pdf.

464

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:445

The above figure reveals that in the state of Wisconsin, there
were close to 100,000 participants in AFDC in 1985.89 When Max
imus was awarded a contract to administer W-2 in 1997, there were
approximately 35,000 participants in W-2.90 In just a year, a little
less than forty percent (approximately 20,000) of the participants
were no longer participating in W-2.91 While the general goal of W
2 at its inception was to get people off the welfare rolls, the forprofit approach enhances that agenda because increasing the reve
nue of private companies on the backs of the poor is not perceived
as being wrong. Instead, agencies highlight that somehow the busi
ness of welfare is to eliminate welfare recipients, shrinking the rolls
is profitable, and the “end of welfare as we know it” is a public
good. In this context, profitability has shifted the welfare agenda
from the realm of serving citizens to the realm of marketing to con
sumers (both the state and potential work sites).
This process of de-centralization could potentially provide an
unprecedented amount of intimacy and interaction between recipi
ents’ needs and the service providers. The structure of W-2 in Mil
waukee County can easily be understood within a pro-capitalist
model of governance. Here, there is great potential to establish a
direct correlation between the performance efficiency of the service
provider—the agency and legion of FEP workers—and a corollary
generation of revenue. Yet the monopoly framework of the zone
paradigm does not operate within the principles of a free market,
where capitalism dictates that efficiency and productivity are gener
ated by choice and competition. There is an almost feudal system
here, where the service provider has sole domain over a zone, elimi
nating the possibility for client choice and hence dismantling the
infrastructure for competition that would ideally maximize service
efficiency.
Undoubtedly, there may be arguments that if clients are al
lowed to utilize any agency they choose, some agencies would have
an overload of clients due to superior service, while others may not
have enough. However, if there were truly a free market system,
then those agencies that lose clients would be required to be more
efficient and competitive. The way in which Milwaukee County’s
W-2 program is organized, efficiency and competition are, in fact,
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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discouraged. Allowing W-2 providers to purchase a monopoly92 in
a particular region not only discourages provider competition and
client choice, but it also allows W-2 regulations to be arbitrarily ap
plied and arbitrarily interpreted, thus producing a lack of clarity
and uniformity in program administration.
Additionally, Milwaukee County has the highest W-2 caseload
in the state of Wisconsin.93 With only five zones of services, there is
no doubt that caseloads are invariably high. While verification of a
particular caseload limit was unavailable, FEP indicated that at
times a FEP worker could have over 200 active clients and another
200 to 300 clients that were simply receiving case management ser
vices. The implication of a high caseload translates into a mechani
zation of services, including high caseloads, little time, no quality
consistency, and perhaps a lowest common denomination approach
to service. One of the end results is that the clients are not just
subject to the whims of a hostile labor market, but they are also
subject to the travails of a callous workfare system. Here,
overburdened FEP workers provide an arbitrary dissemination of
information, which results in limited access to a wider range of aid
and assistance, further reinforcing the working poor status of the
women on W-2. The perfect storm of misinformation, roll reduc
tion incentives, zone monopolization, and discouragement of skill
building converts service provisions into big business, a shadow
market with little oversight and high profit margins.
Despite the renewed focus on independence in the workfare
era and a renewed interest in self-help, women in this study main
tain that W-2 has thrown them into a world of privatized service
provisions where self-sufficiency translates into entering the ranks
of the working poor, where the only opportunities for work resides
in shadow labor. At its inception, W-2 was interested in moving
mothers out of the public welfare state and into the private sphere
of work, any work, so long as the mother was earning a wage.
While it must be recognized that in many cases mothers who move
off of welfare and into the workforce do achieve a modest increase
in economic sustainability, more often it is the case that mothers
92. While W-2 agencies are limited to two three-year contracts at a time, they
have the first right of refusal for renewal of the terms of the contract. See Wisconsin
Works (W-2) and Related Programs Contract 2006-2009, WIS. DEP’T CHILD. & FAMS.,
http://dcf.wisconsin.gov/w2/contracts/20062009/default.htm (last updated Dec. 23, 2010).
93. ANDREA ROBLES, FRED DOOLITTLE, & SUSAN GOODEN, COMMUNITY SER
VICE JOBS IN WISCONSIN WORKS: THE MILWAUKEE COUNTY EXPERIENCE ES-1 (2003),
available at http://www.mdrc.org/publications/344/execsum.pdf.
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move into the workforce arena only to make salaries which are
equal to their previous welfare payments or in some cases signifi
cantly less, without the same health or childcare benefits.94 In this
particular study, many of the mothers expressed frustration with the
lateral and many times downward move from public benefits to pri
vate wages. By way of example, Cynthia, who transitioned from
AFDC to W-2 in 1997 and remained on W-2 until her time limit
expired, has this to say:
I don’t mind working, but if I’m gonna work I want to make
more money than AFDC or W-2 would give me or else what’s
the point. Why should I go out and bust my back for less than $6
dollars an hour at some place like Burger King and they only give
me 20 hours a week and I have to feed my children. That don’t
make no sense. It’s not like I don’t want to work . . . [you might
think that I’m just] lazy and I just don’t want to work, but that is
not the case, I don’t want to be no slave for nobody—I don’t
have no lot of kids, I don’t just go get pregnant for no check, but
I do have kids and they are here and it ain’t their fault. I am not
trying to get rich off welfare, but damn, I ain’t trying to stay poor
either. W-2 sending me out to work and it seem like I ain’t mak
ing hardly no money at all. This job don’t want me and they
damn sho’ don’t want to pay me nothing. All us mothers out
here who strugglin’ on welfare and W-2 and now that we have to
work, we still struggling, cause it’s not enough money and in my
case it’s less. I need help, not a hand out but a real job, where I
can feel proud of myself to go to work, where I can get things my
kids need and things that they want sometimes too. I need a real
job to make real money so I don’t have to live here in this neigh
borhood, but between that little old job I have and W-2 this is all
I can afford. W-2 ain’t really helped me cause I am still po’
[laughing at this last statement] and as long as I’m on W-2 I think
I’m gone stay poor.95

Here, Cynthia expresses the sentiment of many mothers who
participated in the study. She powerfully encapsulates what can be
called the paradox of self-reliance so romantically tied to the world
of wage labor. On the one hand, the W-2 system dictates that wo
men must get off the rolls and work, and in fact women want to do
just that. But on the other hand, there are competing understand
ings of what self-reliance means. Welfare officials relegate these
94. See generally JOEL. F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, WE
PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY, AND WELFARE (1997).
95. Interview by author with Cynthia, a W-2 recipient (2005).
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women to the arguably most visible sign of self-reliance: working
for wages. But the women understand that self-reliance must be
connected to sustainability. In the end, legions of women working
with wages but without self-sufficiency provide a poignant evalua
tion of the transition from welfare to workfare.96
IV.

PROFITS INDUCE PRESSURE

TO

PERFORM

FEP workers are also exposed to a set of undue pressures. If
their professional goal is to clear cases (which in the privatized era
no longer means to solve mothers’ problems), then they are evalu
ated in their job performance based on how many mothers they get
off the welfare rolls. A FEP worker confirms:
So as you can see there is a lot of pressure to clear those cases, at
least if I want to keep my job and keep getting those bonuses
[laughing]. I like the bonuses, but no seriously. I try to help peo
ple, but if there is any indication that this person should be at
least trying on their own, I think that they are job ready, that
there is really nothing we can do for them. As a person I feel bad
because I can understand sometimes where they are coming
from, but at the same time, I have a job to do. You can see how
this could be stressful, I have one devil at one end telling me I
have to, well not directly, but making me feel like I have to get
my case load down and I know I have to get it down. And I have
a devil at the other end, begging me to give them an extension or
not to sanction them or whatever. Sometimes I go home at night
and I don’t want to hear a word from anyone.97

While this study does not suggest that there were conspirato
rial practices afoot in any W-2 agency, one can intuit that FEP
workers were at least encouraged to remove women from the finan
cial support categories on the W-2 ladder and into the job ready
status. This pressure was revealed in the possibility of bonuses that
could be reaped at the end of the fiscal year or at least the security
of employment for quality FEP job performance. Therefore, it
would seem that keeping women suppressed generates profits. Un
surprisingly, not only did the FEP workers in this study reveal the
complexity of the pressures associated with finding appropriate
placement for the W-2 participants, but also the W-2 mothers re
flected on their frustrations with these over-worked FEP workers:
96. See generally JENNIFER MITTELSTADT, FROM WELFARE TO WORKFARE: THE
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LIBERAL REFORM, 1945-1965 (2005).
97. Interview by author with FEP worker (2005).
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Every time I go and see my FEP, she is in a bad mood well she is
in one to me and she always asking me if I found a job yet—there
ain’t no jobs and the more she keep asking me ain’t gonna make
me have a job. I believe that that’s all they want to do is to put us
in these jobs cleaning toilets and stuff and that’s it so they can
keep that money. There was this big scandal with this one agency
so I know they get to keep that money. Every time, I am telling
you she asks me if I been looking for a job as if that’s all I have to
do I mean I do look for a job, but no one trying to hire me except
if I want to clean they toilet or work in a nursing home wiping
someone’s ass and my baby out of diapers so why do I want to do
that for. You see they have lots of cases too, so they just want to
get rid of some of us, but until I find a job that’s good for me and
good for my you know my life you know what I am trying to say
then I am going to stay on W-2 until I can really find something
and I wish she quit asking me if I have a job cuz I don’t.98

This statement reveals that W-2 participants were not immune
from the profit margin pressures associated with decreasing the
numbers of enrollees in W-2. In fact, W-2 clients become unwitting
participants in their own demise. The very fact that W-2 partici
pants have a difficult time navigating or receiving help within the
W-2 industry is the condition upon which W-2 as an industry mea
sures success. FEP workers are encouraged to reduce their
caseloads. It goes without saying that higher caseloads could pro
duce inefficient work product. Therefore, it would make sense to
attempt to move W-2 participants into self-sufficient positions or at
least make it difficult for mothers to gain access to resources that
may discourage a more efficient path to job readiness or resources
that more effectively diminish the profit margin of a contracted
agency. However, there are consequences when welfare becomes a
private institution whose profit is generated by moving women off
the rolls. Not only is the quality of life of W-2 mothers removed
from the rolls at stake, but also the quality of services provided to
the remaining W-2 mothers by stressed FEP workers. The mediat
ing function between FEP workers and W-2 clients continues to be
a supply and demand relationship that rests on the issue of need.
However, amidst a privatization of the welfare system, the very
terms on which need is defined have shifted from the everyday sur
vival and upward mobility of clients, to the job security of FEP
workers and the downsizing of social possibility for everyone in
volved. In the end, FEP workers, alongside—most centrally—cli
98.

Interview by author with Special, a W-2 recipient mother (2005).
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ents, must take the complicated, messy, and uneven realities of
their everyday lives and convert them into commodities that can be
deemed profitable for what has become a welfare industry.
V. COMMODIFICATION

OF

NEED

In a free market capitalist system, all social relations take on a
commodity value.99 When welfare services become privatized, that
free market gives them meaning. However, because the govern
ment to a certain extent is still involved in regulation, in reality,
welfare services are placed in what is called a mixed market—one
where there is a mixture of private and governmental control of the
product or service that has been commodified.100 In any case, com
modification of services transforms welfare benefits into what the
participants refer to as “labor for sale to the highest bidder.” Ac
cording to Naomi:
This system is all messed up. You have people out here hustling
trying to make ends meet and W-2 don’t care. In the beginning
when everyone knew what the hell they were doing, I guess there
were or it seem like there were more opportunities, but now no
one knows what the hell is going on too many ex-W-2 workers as
FEP workers and it seems to me that labor is for sale to the high
est bidder no matter what your skill level is. I have been in this
CSJ for damn near the end of my time and it is not an advantage
for them to put me in a regular job because then they don’t get
99. The basic premise emerges from Karl Marx’s general theory of commodity
fetishism, which argues that in capitalist societies social relationships are transformed
into seemingly objective relationships between commodities or other forms of market
exchange (i.e., currency). However, later scholars have also explored the subjective
nature of class as a mode for explaining capitalist social relations, generally arguing that
the intersectional influence of gender, race, and sexual standpoints do not simply in
form, but equally give meaning to, the commodity form within capitalist social relations.
See Arjun Appadarai, Commodities and the Politics of Value, in INTERPRETING OB
JECTS AND COLLECTIONS, 76, 76 (Susan Pearce, ed., 1994). See generally ANGELA DA
VIS, WOMEN, RACE, AND CLASS (1983); RODERICK A. FERGUSON, ABERRATIONS IN
BACK: TOWARD A QUEER OF COLOR CRITIQUE (2004); CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, BLACK
MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL TRADITION (1983); JOAN WALLACH
SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY, (Rev. ed., Columbia University Press
1999).
100. A mixed market economy is defined as “[a]n economy in which a substantial
number, though by no means all, of the activities of production, distribution and ex
change are undertaken by the government, and there is more interference by the State
than there would be in a market economy. A mixed economy thus combines the char
acteristics of both Capitalism and Socialism.” See THE NORTON DICTIONARY OF MOD
ERN THOUGHT 534 (Allen Bullock & Stephen Trombley, eds., 3d sub. ed. 1999).
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paid as long as I am here because they can’t say I am job ready so
as long as I am here they get paid.101

As this participant reveals, the very needs of W-2 recipients are also
a commodity and subject to be sold in the mixed market like any
other product or service. This translates into FEP workers estab
lishing certain need matrices—where they do not look at the indi
vidual recipient, but they convert the individual person’s experience
into distinct and discreet parts to fit in the matrix.
If the actual needs of the recipient do not meet the matrix then
the recipient has to mold her need to make herself more com
modifiable or translatable within the W-2 market system. The real
ity of this mixed market system is that the market exists to benefit
the private agencies and not the welfare recipients themselves. This
approach is revealed through a number of avenues, such as the mo
nopoly of services by single agencies and the establishment of the
low-skilled working poor brand. When the recipient has reached
their twenty-four month time limit, they are booted out of the pro
gram.102 If they have secured employment, then the W-2 program
has done its job and the private industry wins. However, if they
have not secured employment, the private industry still wins be
cause they reap the contractual windfall of removing yet another
person from the program.
I am going to tell you the truth, it is hard out there. I have tried
to find a job and I look on the computer and in the newspaper.
But no one does not want to hire me. I am not saying it’s racist
or discrimination, there are just no jobs out there for us, it is too
many of us and not enough jobs. But what I don’t understand
though is how are all these Maximus and Y works and OIC still
in business if they can’t find no job for me.103

This woman is demonstrating the ill-effects of what can be un
derstood as the development of a reserve labor force, where we see
a glut in a specific worker population that overwhelms the number
of relevant jobs available in the labor market. However, many
scholars conclude that such a ratio is at best an anomaly within the
nature of economic markets.104 Is this the case here when we have
101.
102.
103.
104.

Interview by author with Naomi, a W-2 recipient (2005).
W-2 Manual, supra note 43, at ch. 2.10.3.
Interview by author with Jones, a W-2 recipient (2005).
For an insightful discussion on this topic see generally GRACE HONG, THE
RUPTURES OF AMERICAN CAPITAL: WOMEN OF COLOR FEMINISM AND THE CULTURE
OF IMMIGRANT LABOR (2006); ALTAGRACIA ORTIZ, PUERTO RICAN WOMEN AND
WORK: BRIDGES IN TRANSATIONAL LABOR (1996); ANDREW ROSS, NICE WORK IF
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public/private partnerships creating companies to produce this re
serve labor force? Are we in fact compelled to entertain the possi
bility that these current economic relationships are not an anomaly,
but at some level intentional? Whatever the case may be, the cur
rent W-2 program is producing a laborer without a labor market.
To be sure, if welfare were still held under the authority of the pub
lic, a reserve labor force would still be produced. But what is signif
icant about the emergence of W-2 is that it produces not simply a
reserve labor force, but a whole new industry where public re
sources are being transferred into private hands. The focus here
should not only be on the laborer but it should draw attention to
the state’s production of a new capitalist: the workfare agency and
their relationship to the shadow market.
In the end, the commodification of need is simply the final
stage, a consequence of the larger privatization of welfare as a so
cial institution. In the current shift from welfare as a social agency
to welfare as a private industry, the idea of efficiency replaces
equality, profit replaces need, and consumer branding has all but
overwhelmed the meaning of citizen rights. It is not that the par
ticipants in this study do not want to work or even that the FEP
workers do not want to help, it is that such interests are fact anti
thetical to the now established market logic of simply and com
pletely getting women off the rolls and the profits generated by that
ethos.
On paper the push to privatization seems productive, cost-ef
fective, and even potentially lucrative. The idea that marketplace
competition models can stem the tide of a bloated, costly, and inef
fective governmental bureaucracy makes sense (and perhaps even
dollars). However, the women in need are lost in the financial
spreadsheets. Their stories in fact reveal the both intended and un
intended pitfalls of a for-profit approach. In the end, we must ask
ourselves, when it comes to our citizens in need, do we want to
associate the “best” solutions with the “cheapest” service?

YOU CAN GET IT: LIFE AND LABOR IN PRECARIOUS TIMES (2009); JENNIFER G. SCHIR
MER, THE LIMITS OF REFORM: WOMEN, CAPITAL, AND REFORM (1982); Fred Magdoff
and Harry Magdoff, Disposable Workers: Today’s Reserve Army of Labor, MONTHLY
REV. Vol. 55, No.11 (April 2004), available at www.monthlyreview.org/0404magdoff.
htm; Elaine McCrate, ‘Hitting Bottom’: Welfare ‘Reform’ and Labor Markets, DOLLARS
& SENSE (Sept./Oct. 1997); Alan Finder, Evidence is Scant that Workfare Leads to FullTime Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1998, available at http://www.duke.edu/~ldbaker/clip
pings/ny-workfare.html.
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CONCLUSION
With our inheritance of this cost/benefit legacy in mind we
need to begin thinking about how to recreate the framework for
providing public services. The community service component of W
2 and its actual function powerfully demonstrates how W-2 mothers
have become a reserve labor force. But at the same time the con
tours of W-2 make reserve labor status profitable, not for the
mothers, but for the sub-contracted agencies. The relationship be
tween W-2 mothers, the status of community service, and the posi
tion of sub-contracted agencies have generated a shadow market as
a consequence of welfare privatization. The ways in which these
women are held captive to a world without work, a world without
skill building, and limited ways out become the grounds upon which
sub-contracting agencies generate profit. Under the shroud of “cost
effectiveness,” private agencies are reaping the financial windfall of
“pimping” the state based on their ability to market their skills at
converting welfare mothers into low-wage workers.105 What will be
the ultimate cost?

105. In 2001 five agencies controlled the W-2 zones in Milwaukee County. Em
ployment Solutions was paid over 93 million dollars, OIC was paid over 50 million
dollars, UMOS was paid over 39 million dollars, YW-Works was paid over 38 million
dollars and Maximus was paid over 48 million dollars to provide service to W-2 clients.
See DEP’T OF WORKFORCE DEV., AN EVALUATION: WISCONSIN WORK’S (W-2) PRO
GRAM, (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lab/reports/01-7full.pdf.
According to Wisconsin Fiscal Audit Bureaus Report in 2001, spending on welfare in
creased by over 150 million dollars from 1986 to 2001. Profits received by W-2 agencies
totaled over 65 million dollars. Id..
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